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Abstract
This paper shows that domestic regulations may fully respect the non-discrimination
principle of the WTO and still act as a protectionist device. The core mechanism is a
profit shifting effect between firms within sectors. By increasing production costs of all
operating firms in a market, domestic regulations force the least efficient firms to exit,
increasing market shares of surviving firms. This generates protectionism in the aggregate
if it forces relatively more foreign firms to exit, or if domestic firms are relatively more
efficient. Introducing political economy motives in the model, this paper shows that trade
liberalization increases the use of domestic regulations in the non-cooperative equilibrium,
because it improves their protectionist effect. Moreover, a trade agreement may be welfare
reducing if governments only care about the most efficient firms. If the firm productivity
distribution differs across countries, the low productivity country cannot retaliate to a non-
discriminatory protectionist policy from the high productivity country. In this context, a
Pareto improving trade agreement requires an international income redistribution between
countries, which is at odds with the principle of reciprocity in trade negotiations. These
results may help explaining why recent trade negotiations are proven difficult and face
increasing opposition.
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1 Introduction
The last decades have been marked by important progress in liberalizing international trade.
Through the succession of multilateral negotiation rounds at the GATT/WTO, tariffs, the most
explicit protectionist policy tool, have been reduced to historically low levels. These negotiations
have been based on two key principles: non-discrimination and reciprocity.1 Despite this clear
success, suspicion remains that protectionist policies may be carried out through the use of
other, less explicit policy instruments. This possibility led to important concerns in trade
negotiations about the increasing prevalence of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) and particularly
those regarding domestic regulations and standards.2
These domestic regulations may be justified for many reasons such as the need of protect-
ing public health, the environment, respecting social objectives, ensuring a relevant product
information to consumers or fitting local tastes. However, they also raise new questions. Their
implementation may be justified because of their welfare improving effects, but the extra adap-
tation costs they generate may have a trade restrictive effect. There is thus a fear that, while
officially set up for legitimate objectives, they may in fact be implemented, at least partly, to
harm foreign producers. Domestic regulations may be designed to be easier to deal with for do-
mestic producers, being de facto discriminatory and thus used as hidden protectionist policies.3
To find a balance between these fair goals but preventing the use of domestic regulations as
a protectionist tool, WTO redactors explicitly introduced a Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT)
agreement and a Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) agreement. These agreements allow coun-
tries to set their own domestic regulations and standards. But they stipulate that any domestic
regulation or technical standard should fully respect the non-discrimination principle. They
also promote the use of international standards.
The main objective of this paper is to show that the key principles of the WTO do not ensure
efficient outcomes when domestic regulations are considered. Trade protection is usually broadly
defined as “government action or inaction that discriminates in favor of home producers against
foreign producers” (e.g. Anderson (2013)). This paper challenges this definition by showing
that, with domestic regulations, there is no need to discriminate between domestic and foreign
producers (at the micro level) to favor the domestic industry at the expense of the foreign
1The non-discrimination principle requires countries to apply the same trade policies to foreign firms, no matter
their country of origin (most favored nation) and to apply the same domestic policies to domestic and foreign
firms (national treatment). The principle of reciprocity is a principle that should govern trade negotiations and
requires that countries exchange “equivalent concessions” in trade barriers reductions/access to foreign markets.
2According to the 2012 World Trade report, the number of new Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) notifi-
cations per year was around 200 in 1995 to go up to around 1100 in 2010. The number of Technical Barrier to
Trade (TBT) notifications per year was less than 200 in 1995 to go up to around 1500 in 2010. In both cases,
the number of specific trade concerns (STC) raised at the WTO increased over the years.
3see for example Grundke and Moser (2019).
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industry (at the macro level).4 Therefore, domestic regulations may be turned away from their
official welfare enhancing objectives and used as protectionist devices, while fully respecting the
principle of non-discrimination. Moreover, in this context, the principle of reciprocity may not
ensure a Pareto improving trade agreement.
The core mechanism is a profit shifting effect between firms within sectors. Suppose a
domestic regulation raises production costs of all firms operating in the local market. The
first, direct effect is to force the least efficient firms to leave the market. This exit induces a
second, indirect effect: it increases market shares of surviving firms. This indirect effect may
dominate for the most efficient firms. The introduction of any costly regulation or standard
thus reallocates market shares and profits from the least efficient domestic and foreign firms
towards the most efficient domestic and foreign firms. Crucially, this mechanism is at work even
if the cost increase is strictly the same for all firms, i.e. without discriminating between firms.
This mechanism can generate protectionism for two reasons. The first is based on the direct
effect. While foreign and domestic firms pay in absolute terms the same additional costs to access
the domestic market, the cost increase may be larger in relative terms for foreign firms (i.e. the
exporters). In other words, a non-discriminatory NTM may distort their relative cost structure.
When properly designed, such an NTM will force relatively more foreign producers to exit and
therefore generates an aggregate profit shifting effect in the local market from the foreign to
the domestic industry. The second reason is based on the indirect effect and is straightforward:
even if the NTM does not distort the relative cost structure, it has an aggregate protectionist
effect if domestic firms are relatively more productive, and therefore over-represented among
the group of the most efficient firms. This profit shifting effect between firms within sectors
has been studied in the literature, addressing other issues.5 Nonetheless, and to the best of my
knowledge, this paper is the first to consider it as a protectionist mechanism and addresses how
it challenges the key principles of the WTO.
This paper develops a simple model to illustrate the two effects of the mechanism described
above. We consider a “new trade” model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms
in the line of Chaney (2008), where we assume away free entry to get profits in equilibrium and
where a non-manufacturing sector absorbs all trade imbalances, shutting down (standard) terms
of trade effects. We start from a situation where governments are assumed to have reached a
trade agreement in the spirit of the WTO, where they thus do not have discriminatory policy
4Note that this protectionist effect induced by domestic regulations is distinct from another important concern,
namely that domestic regulations may generate global inefficiencies when governments do not internalize the effect
of these measures on foreign countries (see Grossman et al. (2020)).
5Most notably, it is at the roots of “raising rival costs” strategies (Salop and Scheffman (1983), Rogerson
(1984)).
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instruments at their disposal, such as tariffs. Governments can only, but freely, choose local
regulations and standards (i.e. NTMs) provided that they are non-discriminatory.6
To isolate the protectionist motive behind these NTMs, we consider them as having no
welfare improving effect. This also allows to keep the argument general, as it holds no matter
the type of regulations and standards considered and the type of externalities they are (offi-
cially) supposed to fix. NTMs in the model only increase operation costs for firms in the local
market.7 The unique reason behind their implementation is therefore a beggar-thy-neighbor
motive: to shift profits in the local market from foreign to domestic firms in the aggregate.
The alternative would be to introduce positive welfare effects to these NTMs, but this would
make the protectionist motive more difficult to distinguish from a global inefficiency induced by
governments not internalizing the impact of their decisions on other countries. Moreover, it is
not clear how this positive effect should enter the utility function, which would depend on the
inefficiency/externality NTMs are supposed to solve, e.g. do they address pollution concerns
or tastes divergence between countries? Ruling out any positive effect on welfare implies that
a benevolent government would not implement them, as they only consist in a cost burden
for firms. Yet, our mechanism emphasizes a major role for producers’ interests. We therefore
introduce political economy motives in the objective function of the government.
To illustrate the two mechanisms underlined above in a tractable way, we present two ver-
sions of the model. We first consider a fully symmetric two country version of the model.
Here, an NTM distorts the cost structure between domestic firms and (foreign) exporters, as
long as the export fixed cost is not equal to the domestic fixed cost. Governments balance
the welfare loss due to less varieties available with the income gains by the domestic industry
in the local market. Hence, in the non-cooperative equilibrium, each country may implement
some NTMs for protectionist purposes. But this unilateral policy is clearly inefficient, as the
mirror country chooses the exact same policy, withdrawing the gains in the domestic market by
losses in the foreign market. Countries are therefore trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma and the
non-discrimination principle cannot preclude this situation. Moreover, we show that a decrease
in trade costs increases the equilibrium level of NTMs, as its protectionist effect becomes more
effective when the economy is more open, i.e. the profit shifting is larger. This means that,
somewhat counterintuitively, a local industry facing more competition from abroad may ask
to be taxed more, not less. This result may explain the rise in NTMs observed over the last
decades and support the view that this rise is, at least partly, driven by protectionist motives.
6We thus also abstract from the use of labor taxes/subsidies, as they would only apply to domestic producers.
7We assume the government can choose NTMs to increase either the fixed or the variable cost of firms, or
both. As we will show, in this setup with constant markups, the fixed cost is the only one that can generate an
exit differential between domestic and foreign firms and will thus be the only one used in equilibrium.
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Nevertheless, in this symmetric two country world, the principle of reciprocity allows trade
negotiations on a deep agreement (i.e. covering domestic policies) to reach an efficient outcome:
the two countries can exchange equivalent reductions in the cost of NTMs, which would result
in equal exchanges in market access, more varieties available to consumers, and equal welfare
gains in both countries. This result however only holds if governments care about their entire
industry. If they care about the most efficient firms only, a trade agreement may be welfare
reducing, because those firms benefit from NTMs in the other country.
This result also does not hold when comparing asymmetric countries. To highlight this
point, we next introduce an asymmetry in the firm productivity distribution, thus allowing to
focus on the second indirect effect described above. In this case, one country may be interested
in running a non-discriminatory protectionist policy because it hosts relatively more of the
most efficient firms. But, this cannot be the case for the other country, as implementing such
non-discriminatory measures would shift profits away from its industry. It follows that in
the non-cooperative equilibrium, only one country may put NTMs in place for a protectionist
purpose.
In this situation, a cooperative equilibrium reached by a new trade agreement can still be
Pareto improving. However, for this to be the case, countries should not exchange “equivalent
concessions”. To be Pareto improving, a trade agreement necessitates an uneven exchange
of market access and profits and thus an international income redistribution from the high
to the low productivity country. This is at odds with the reciprocity principle. This result
also casts doubt on the desirability of implementing international standards and rather call for
harmonization only among similar countries.8 More generally, this result may illustrate why
recent trade negotiations at the WTO have proven difficult, with complaints from developing
countries about stringent regulations that restrict access to developed countries markets.
Related literature and paper contribution
The mechanism put forward in this paper has empirical support, in two separate ways. First,
there is empirical evidence for “raising rivals’ costs” strategies; increased costs for all benefit
the best firms at the expense of less efficient competitors.9 This provides evidence for the core
8A similar result appears in the study of optimal trade policy in the presence of preference heterogeneity
(Grossman et al. (2020), Parenti and Vannoorenberghe (2019)). Both papers find that differences in preferences
between countries implies that a pure harmonization of standards may not be optimal. While our conclusion is
the same, it complements theirs as based on supply-side reasons (differences in the productivity distribution) and
not demand-side reasons.
9For example, Bartel and Thomas (1987) have assessed the impact of the implementation of a new regulation
in the late 70s in the US, OSHA, that aimed at increasing the safety on workplaces. They estimate the direct
negative effect and the indirect positive effect of this regulation and find evidence for both. Another example is
Suzuki (2013) who shows that an increase of one standard deviation in land use regulation in Texas increases the
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mechanism, but typically does not assess its protectionist impact. Second, the empirical trade
literature has explored the potential protectionist impact of NTMs, in particular TBTs and
SPS measures. Interestingly, several studies at the firm level have documented a heterogeneous
protectionist impact across firms (exporters). For instance, Fontagné et al. (2015) test the
impact of the SPS measures that raised concerns at the WTO and find that large exporters
suffer less than small ones. Fugazza et al. (2018) find that large Peruvian exporters benefit
rather than lose from the introduction of NTMs in their destination markets. The reverse is
true for small exporters, which are hurt by more stringent market-access barriers. These papers
cannot really assess whether the measures are discriminatory (or not) as they do not observe
the impact on domestic firms, but their results support our mechanism.10
On the theoretical side, this paper first relates to the role of non-discrimination and reci-
procity in trade negotiations. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) have shown under perfect competition
that these two key principles of the GATT/WTO allow to neutralize the terms of trade effect
and thus allow to reach efficient outcomes in trade negotiations, even when governments are
politically motivated. With imperfect competition, trade agreements may have to solve for
externalities other than terms of trade, such as production delocation or profit shifting. Several
papers have shown that these principles still allow trade agreements to reach efficient out-
comes.11 In particular, Ossa (2011) has reinterpreted these two principles in a “new trade”
model à la Krugman where countries have an incentive to raise import tariffs in order to attract
a larger share of the world manufacturing production. This delocation effect may be alterna-
tively understood as a profit shifting effect if we assume away free entry. Protected domestic
firms then capture profits of foreign firms (Ossa (2012, 2014)).12 It is important to note that
the profit shifting we put forward in this paper is different and new because, by considering
another instrument than tariffs, profits shift from inefficient towards efficient firms and not from
foreign to domestic firms. It is only indirectly, in the aggregate, that it can generate protection.
When tariff manipulations are restricted, countries may implement some regulatory pro-
tectionism, i.e. use domestic regulations and standards that favor domestic firms over foreign
entry cost in the lodging industry by 10%, decreases the number of operating firms (hotels) by 15% and increases
the revenue per room by 6%. Again, surviving firms benefit from the regulation because of the less competitive
environment induced by the regulation.
10More evidence in line with our mechanism includes Asprilla et al. (2019) on the impact of NTMs on market
power, Fontagne et al. (2020) on trade facilitations measures, or Fernandes et al. (2019) on pesticides regulations.
11These new motives for a trade agreement appear because governments do not have all policy instruments at
their disposal, which is also the case in this paper. See Bagwell and Staiger (2012, 2015), Campolmi et al. (2014)
and Grossman (2016) for a discussion.
12Mrazova (2011) makes a similar argument in an oligopolistic framework, showing that import tariffs may
be motivated by both a terms of trade effect and a profit shifting effect. As Ossa (2011), she gives a new
interpretation to the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity, which still ensures an efficient outcome.
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ones.13 This discrimination may be clear or hidden: NTMs may be de jure non-discriminatory,
but de facto easier to deal with for domestic firms (see Sykes (1999)). This paper highlights
that NTMs do not need to put any extra burden on foreign firms to be used as protectionist
instruments. Building on Bagwell and Staiger (2001), Staiger and Sykes (2011) have shown that
large countries may still use de facto non-discriminatory product standards to manipulate their
terms of trade. Mei (2019) extends Ossa (2011) to domestic regulations and makes a similar
argument. When there is a negative consumption externality, large countries may pass part of
the cost of the regulation on foreign firms inducing a global inefficiency, even under national
treatment. The mechanism in this paper is different as it relies on a pure local externality only,
based on rent capturing by the domestic industry.
The literature has explored the incentives of heterogeneous firms to lobby for trade policy
outcomes. One empirical regularity is that only the most efficient firms do lobbying (Bombardini
(2008), Blanga-Gubbay et al. (2020)). This generates an interesting insight. This paper focuses
on the interest of the whole domestic industry, but the mechanism first favors the most efficient
firms. In a situation where only the best firms are organized in each market, their interests will
be aligned internationally, which is not the case if the interest of whole industry is considered. In
this situation, a deep trade agreement may be welfare reducing because governments decisions
are shaped by the interests of the best firms that also benefit from NTMs in their export
markets. This echoes Rodrik (2018), who suggests that recent trade agreements over regulatory
rules may actually be shaped by the rent-seeking behavior of large exporters. It also shows that
it is important to know which firms are politically organized in each country to understand if
their interests are aligned or opposed internationally, thus resulting, in the words of Maggi and
Ossa (2019), in “co-lobbying” or “counter lobbying” in international negotiations.
2 Model - symmetric countries
2.1 Economic environment
We consider a simple heterogeneous firm trade model in the line of Chaney (2008), with two
symmetric countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ). Without loss of generality, we focus on the
Home perspective. Each economy is composed of two sectors: M and A. Labor (L) is the only
factor of production. Sector M is characterized by increasing returns to scale in the production
of a continuum of varieties and is subject to monopolistic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz. Sector
13See for example Fischer and Serra (2000), Baldwin (2000), Suwa Eisenmann and Verdier (2002). Note that
regulatory protectionism may also occur without discriminating foreign firms if preferences differ among countries,
see Grossman et al. (2020) for a comprehensive analysis.
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A produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, and
serves as a numeraire. Firms are owned by domestic agents.
Consumers.
The preferences of the representative consumer in both countries are depicted by a quasi-
linear utility function U , with a CES sub-utility function over the continuum of manufacturing
varieties:14
U = A+ µ lnCM CM =
(∫
c
1− 1
σ
i
) 1
1− 1σ , with σ > 1 (1)
CM and A denote consumption for the M composite good and the numeraire good, respectively.
σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties and µ the preference
parameter over manufactured goods. Utility maximization yields the following domestic demand
for variety i:
ci =
µL∫
h∈Θ p
1−σ
h dh
p−σi (2)
where pi is the price of variety i, and Θ is the set of all available varieties h in this economy.
From now on, we normalize the mass of consumers/workers to L = 1.
Firms.
The numeraire good (A) is produced with one unit of labor per unit of output and the wage
rate is normalized to 1. We assume that µ is sufficiently small such that both countries produce
good A. This good is freely traded between countries, ensuring factor price equalization.
In order to operate in the manufacturing sector, firms have to pay two types of fixed overhead
production costs. First, firms have to pay FP , the cost of setting up the production facility.
On top of it, firms also have to bear a fixed cost Fd, capturing the cost of distribution in the
domestic market and the cost of adapting the product to the standards and regulations in place.
To alleviate notations, we label F = FP + Fd, the total amount of fixed costs any firm has to
pay to operate in its domestic market.
A firm i produces with a constant marginal production cost ai. The cost of producing q
units of good i with marginal cost ai is thus: Ci(q) = aiq + F . Given the demand function (2),
the optimal price charged by a firm i is a constant mark-up over its marginal cost: pi =
σ
σ−1ai.
We refer to the profits of a Home firm i in its domestic (Home) market as πHH ; we use the first
subscript for the firm location and the second for the destination market. Profits are given by:
πHH (ai) =
µ
σ
P σ−1H
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
a1−σi − F (3)
14The use of a quasi-linear utility function is motivated by the introduction of political economy motives for
protection within this single manufacturing sector economy. The market outcome would not be qualitatively be
different with homothetic preferences. This extension is available upon request.
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where PH =
(∫
i∈Θ p
1−σ
i di
) 1
1−σ is the perfect price index at Home.
Accessing the foreign market is also costly and entails two types of trade costs. In order
to serve the foreign market, firms first have to pay an additional fixed cost Fx. This reflects
the costs implied by the regulations and standards in the foreign country, as well as the costs
associated with managing remotely the distribution of the firm’s product; it is the counterpart of
Fd in the foreign market. Second, shipping goods to the foreign country is subject to an iceberg
variable trade cost τ .15 Finally, we also make the standard assumption that τ1−σF < Fx,
ensuring that only a fraction of operating firms chooses to export. It follows that profits of firm
i in the foreign market are:
πFH (ai) =
µ
σ
P σ−1H τ
1−σ
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
a1−σi − Fx (4)
Firm heterogeneity.
We assume that firms’ marginal costs are drawn from a Pareto distribution. This assump-
tion is made because, beyond tractability, it ensures that aggregate profits in each market are
independent of the number of operating firms. It thus allows us to focus on a specific case where
the motive for implementing an NTM exclusively comes from a profit shifting effect between
firms. Specifically, we assume that marginal costs a are comprised between 0 and 1, and are
drawn from a Pareto distribution G(a) with a shape parameter ρ > 1: G(a) = aρ.16 Finally,
as we assume away free entry, we simply consider as in Chaney (2008) that there is a group of
entrepreneurs proportional to country size.
Policy instrument: Non-discriminatory NTMs.
As explained in the introduction, we consider a situation where governments have to fully
comply with non-discriminatory obligations. The only policy instruments available are those
that affect domestic and foreign firms in the exact same way. NTMs and in particular TBTs
and SPSs measures are allowed by the WTO, as long as they are implemented for social, health
or sanitary purposes and under the condition that they are non-discriminatory. Arguably, these
measures may raise the cost of production for firms. We thus assume that the implementation
of non-discriminatory NTMs in country j implies some extra costs that all firms have to bear
in order to operate in this market.17 NTMs in country j may affect both the fixed and variable
costs of all operating firms. They may increase fixed costs (Fd or Fx) by an amount Tj , and
15Note that we focus on the case where these trade costs are exogenous, the policymaker cannot manipulate
them.
16We assume that the standard regularity condition is satisfied: ρ− (σ − 1) > 0.
17These costs are however only local: paying them allows to respect the local regulation and standards but
does not help meeting regulations and standards in the other country.
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the variable cost of a firm i by an amount tj ≡ κjai. However, in this setup of monopolistic
competition with CES preferences and no income effect, a change in the variable cost is fully
neutral for firms. It increases all prices proportionally. Relative prices, market shares and thus
profits stay constant, i.e.
∂πij
∂κj
= 0, leaving the equilibrium mass of operating firms unaffected.
It only harms consumers and, in the absence of any positive effect on welfare, should not be used
by a policy maker. In contrast, an increase in the fixed costs has two opposite effects on firms
profits. First, it reduces profits of all operating firms, forcing the least efficient firms to exit the
market. In turn, it redistributes market shares of exiters towards the firms that survive. For
some of those firms, this last effect will dominate and they will thus benefit from this measure.
Introducing the additional fixed cost Tj into (3) and (4) for a firm i and taking the derivative,
we get:
∂πij
∂Tj
=
µ
σ
∂P σ−1j
∂Tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive effect
p1−σij − 1︸︷︷︸
negative effect
(5)
This highlights what we mean by non-discriminatory at the micro level: all operating firms
pay the additional cost Tj , and two firms with the same local price experience the same profit
variation, no matter their country of origin. We show in the next section how this basic mecha-
nism may generate protectionism in the aggregate. In the following it will be useful to measure
everything relative to the fixed costs F domestic firms have to pay. Hence, we rewrite the policy
instrument in country j as Tj = βjF . Similarly, we rewrite the fixed costs foreign firms have
to pay as Fx = γF , where γ measures the relative fixed costs to access market j for domestic
and foreign producers. In the following, we thus focus on the role of βj , the policy intrument
governments choose. We interpret a larger βj as a more stringent standard or regulation (NTM)
in country j.18
2.2 Market equilibrium
We first describe the equilibrium given the policy choices βH and βF . In the next section, we
will analyze the government choice.
Given the symmetry of the model, we focus on the Home market. Firms first draw their
marginal costs from G(a). Given their draw, they decide to produce or not and whether to serve
the foreign market as well. Firms decide to produce and serve the domestic market if their draw
is such that ai ≤ aHH , where aHH is defined by πHH(aHH) = 0. Foreign firms decide to serve
the Home market if their draw is such that ai ≤ aFH , where aFH is defined by πFH(aFH) = 0.
Note that, due to the imposed symmetry between countries, these two cutoffs are the same in
18In the following, we may also refer to a larger βj as a higher level of NTMs, or to an increase in NTMs.
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the two countries and exporters are the mirror image of importers. The two zero-cutoff-profit
(ZCP) conditions to serve market H are given by:
πHH (aHH) = 0⇔
µ
σ
P σ−1H
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
a1−σHH = (1 + βH)F (6)
πFH (aFH) = 0⇔
µ
σ
P σ−1H
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
τ1−σa1−σFH = (γ + βH)F (7)
with P 1−σH = λ
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ (
a1−σ+ρHH + τ
1−σa1−σ+ρFH
)
and λ = ρ1−σ+ρ .
Using these two conditions, it is straightforward to solve for the two endogenous variables
aHH and aFH . Given G(a), the mass of Home and Foreign firms serving the Home market
are:19
aρHH =
µ
σλF
1
(1 + βH)
1(
1 + τ1−σ
(
1+βH
γ+βH
τ1−σ
) 1−σ+ρ
σ−1
) (8)
aρFH =
µ
σλF
1
(1 + βH)
(
1+βH
γ+βH
τ1−σ
) ρ
σ−1(
1 + τ1−σ
(
1+βH
γ+βH
τ1−σ
) 1−σ+ρ
σ−1
) (9)
We can now assess the impact of an NTM on the sharing of pure profits between domestic and
foreign competitors. To do so, we compute the aggregate pure profits made by Home firms in
market H: ΠHH =
∫ aHH
0 πHH(a)dG(a) and the aggregate pure profits made by Foreign firms
in market H: ΠFH =
∫ aFH
0 πFH(a)dG(a). We get:
ΠHH(βH) =
µ
ρ
(
σ − 1
σ
)
1(
1 + τ1−σ
(
(1+βH)
(γ+βH)
τ1−σ
) 1−σ+ρ
σ−1
) (10)
ΠFH(βH) =
µ
ρ
(
σ − 1
σ
) γ+βH
1+βH
(
1+βH
γ+βH
τ1−σ
) ρ
σ−1(
1 + τ1−σ
(
1+βH
γ+βH
τ1−σ
) 1−σ+ρ
σ−1
) (11)
Here appears a nice property of the Pareto distribution: the aggregate pure profits made by
operating firms is independent of the stringency of the NTM βH :
ΠHH + ΠFH =
µ
ρ
(
σ − 1
σ
)
(12)
It follows:
19We assume that µ
σλF
< 1, to ensure there is always selection.
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Lemma 1. The pure profit variation of any set of firms due to any NTM is equal to the opposite
of pure profit variation of all other firms.
A change in the stringency of the NTM thus only affects the sharing of the total profits in
a market. We get:
∂ΠHH
∂βH
= (1− γ) µ
σλ
(
1+βH
γ+βH
τ1−σ
) ρ
σ−1
(1 + βH)
2
(
1 + τ1−σ
(
1+βH
γ+βH
τ1−σ
) 1−σ+ρ
σ−1
)2 (13)
While non-discriminatory, the NTM produces an aggregate profit shifting between domestic
and foreign firms, as long as γ 6= 1: there is not only a profit shifting from less to more efficient
firms, the sharing of the aggregate profits between Home and Foreign firms is also affected.
What is driving this result? The NTM cost that firms have to pay to serve the domestic market
is the same for domestic and foreign firms. However, the NTM distorts the relative fixed cost
that domestic and foreign firms have to pay in order to operate in the domestic market, as
long as γ 6= 1. The percentage increase in the total fixed cost paid to operate is indeed not
the same. It is equal to βH for domestic firms and to
βH
γ for foreign firms. Therefore, as the
change in demand (µP σ−1) is the same for all firms, the group that faces a larger percentage
fixed cost will experience a fiercer selection due to the NTM. It follows that, if γ < 1, an NTM
implementation is tougher for foreign firms than for domestic firms (aFH decreases relatively
more than aHH) and generates an aggregate profit shifting from foreign to domestic firms. It
follows:
Lemma 2. If γ < 1, the pure profit variation of all domestic firms on the domestic market due
to any NTM is positive: a non-discriminatory NTM has an aggregate protectionist effect.
In the following, we will restrict our analysis to the case where γ < 1. We have some reasons
to focus on this situation. First, this seems more natural when considering our framework.
Indeed, if γ > 1, foreign firms would have to pay more fixed costs to access the domestic
market than domestic firms, although those costs do not cover the costs associated with setting
up the production facility that domestic firms have to pay. Moreover, γ < 1 is in line with
recent calibrations of trade models with heterogeneous firms. For example, di Giovanni and
Levchenko (2012) have calibrated a model in line with our framework and find that, over a
sample of 50 countries, fixed costs associated with entry in a foreign market are on average
about 40% of the fixed costs associated with domestic production, i.e. γ = 0.4. Melitz and
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Redding (2015) also calibrate a heterogeneous firm trade model and pick γ = 0.545 in order to
match the average fraction of U.S. manufacturing firms that export. Finally, note that if γ > 1,
a non-discriminatory protectionist policy is still possible; governments should then implement
an entry subsidy for all firms rather than costly regulations and standards.
3 Equilibrium policy choice
We now turn to the objective function of the government and its choice in the non-cooperative
and cooperative equilibrium.
3.1 Government objective function
We assume that the objective function of the government is a weighted average between social
welfare and profits of domestic firms. The political economy motives behind this objective
function may be easily micro-funded via the Protection for Sale framework of Grossman and
Helpman (1994), assuming that the entire domestic industry is politically organized.20 We may
alternatively assume that the government only cares about the profits of a subset of firms only
(those that would be organized). We assume that the government objective function takes the
following form:
GH(βH , βF ) = αWH(βH , βF ) + (1− α) ΠH (βH , βF ) (14)
with α ∈ (0, 1) and where WH(βH , βF ) represents social welfare, which is defined as:
WH(βH , βF ) = ΠH (βH , βF ) + 1 + SH(βH) (15)
Indirect utility is measured by the sum of total income, i.e. firms’ profits in both markets:
ΠH (βH , βF ) = ΠHH (βH) + ΠHF (βF ) and labor earnings (normalized to 1), plus the consumer
surplus SH(βH) = µ ln
µ
PH
− µ. In this setup without income effects, NTMs have only local
effects. Given the form of preferences, variations in total income only translate into variations
in the consumption of the numeraire good. Thus, NTMs at Home do not affect spending and
thus profits in the Foreign market. Similarly, consumer surplus only depends on the decision
made by the domestic government and is not affected by the foreign government’s decision.21
20Note that this formulation may also capture other political economy motives for protection since in this setup
firm profits are proportional to firm sales and to employment in the manufacturing sector.
21Without income effects, the effect that is absent is the negative impact of βH on foreign income, that in
turn would reduce foreign consumption of manufactured goods and export profits made by domestic firms there.
Introducing income effects does not qualitatively change the effect of NTMs. An example with Cobb Douglas
preferences is available upon request.
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The optimal choice for the government is given by:
α
∂WH(βH , βF )
∂βH
+ (1− α) ∂ΠH(βH , βF )
∂βH
= 0 (16)
Given that profits are separable and immune from the policy choice in the other market, the
decision of the two governments are independent: no matter the decision of the Foreign gov-
ernment, the decision of the Home government only affects the sharing of aggregate profits in
the Home market, which does not depend on the Foreign decision. The optimal choice of the
government is equivalent to:
α
∂SH(βH)
∂βH
+
∂ΠHH(βH)
∂βH
= 0 (17)
The implementation of NTMs has two effects. First, it reduces consumer surplus, by forcing
some firms to exit the market: ∂SH(βH)∂βH < 0. Second, as shown above, it increases the aggregate
market share of Home firms in their domestic market, thus increasing their profits: ∂ΠHH∂βH > 0.
As NTMs only generate a local externality, the government decision boils down to a tradeoff
between the (weighted) loss of consumer surplus and the income gain coming from the profit
shifting.
3.2 Non-cooperative equilibrium policy choice
Replacing into (17) and rearranging, we obtain an implicit solution for β∗H :
σ − 1
σ
= α
1 + β∗H
1− γ
(
1 + τ1−σ
(
1 + β∗H
γ + β∗H
τ1−σ
) 1−σ+ρ
σ−1
)(
1 +
(
γ + β∗H
1 + β∗H
τσ−1
) ρ
σ−1
)
(18)
The right-hand side of this expression is monotonically increasing in βH , ensuring a unique
solution β∗H .
22 The more the government puts weight on domestic profits and income (lower
α), the larger β∗H is. Note that this profit shifting effect is not driven by a terms of trade
externality. Standard terms of trade are fixed in this setup with an outside good. With a utility
based measure, they would go in the opposite direction as the NTM decreases imports while
export do not change. By introducing an NTM, the government pushes the economy to produce
and consume a smaller mass of varieties. Even if this effect is opposite to closing the gap with
the social planner solution, it allows the domestic industry to capture more of the rents in the
monopolistic sector. If those are valued enough by the government (low enough α), it leads to a
protectionist NTM. Without political economy motives however (α = 1), the optimal decision
22See appendix A for a proof.
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is to not implement any NTM, as the effect on consumer surplus always dominates the one on
income. Note that we have assumed here that the government cares about the entire domestic
industry. From a lobbying perspective however, if only the most efficient firms are organized as
suggested in the literature (e.g. Bombardini (2008), Blanga-Gubbay et al. (2020)), the outcome
may be a more stringent NTM, because the most efficient firms are those that gain from the
profit shifting. This will be crucial when looking at the outcome of the cooperative equilibrium.
Trade liberalization.
One important question is the impact of trade openness on the equilibrium level of NTMs.
Two possibilities have been put forward. During the multilateral negotiations leading to the
creation of the WTO, a serious concern in the public debate was the possibility of a race to the
bottom with respect to domestic regulations due to the fiercer market competition induced by
lower tariffs (see Bagwell and Staiger (2001) for a discussion). The literature has alternatively
suggested that there could be some trade policy substitution. As countries commit to reduce
tariffs, they may be tempted to use other policy instruments, like some discriminatory NTMs,
to restore previous levels of trade protection (see Kee et al. (2009), Limao and Tovar (2011),
Beverelli et al. (2019)). The empirical evidence points to an increase in NTMs over time
(e.g. Ederington and Ruta (2016)). This paper proposes another reason for this trend. Trade
liberalization may increase the equilibirum level of NTMs because it affects the relative exit
rate of Home and Foreign firms inplied by an NTM. We get:
Proposition 1. The lower the variable trade costs, the larger the equilibrium NTM.
Proof. see appendix A.
This result may sound like a trade policy substitution. It is however different. Trade
liberalization leads Foreign firms to benefit from a better access to the Home market and thus a
larger local market share, both because CIF prices of exporters are lower and because new (less
efficient) foreign firms enter the Home market. A given NTM still forces the least efficient firms
to exit, but the exit diffferential between Home and Foreign firms is magnified with lower trade
costs, as can be easily checked taking the ratio of (8) and (9). In turn, the same NTM leads
to a larger aggregate profit shifting with lower trade costs, i.e. ∂
2ΠHH(βH)
∂β∂τ < 0. The efficiency
of NTMs to protect the domestic industry is thus increased by lower trade costs. From the
perspective of a lobbying model where the domestic industry is organized, this result is also
interesting. A decrease in trade costs increases market competition which in turn decreases
market shares of all domestic firms. In contrast to the race to the bottom hypothesis, the
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optimal response of an organized sector in that case is not to ask for less taxation, but for
more. This result may be a reason why trade liberalization seems to have increased incentives to
implement these NTMs. At least part of this increase may be due to the improved protectionist
effect of these measures, even if they are de facto fully non-discriminatory.
3.3 Cooperative equilibrium
Cooperative equilibrium policy choice and reciprocity.
Under cooperation, governments decide on βH and βF to maximize their joint objective
function GW (βH , βF ). We have:
GH(βH , βF ) = α+ αSH(βH) + ΠH (βH , βF )
GF (βF , βH) = α+ αSF (βF ) + ΠF (βF , βH)
Recall that ΠH (βH , βF ) + ΠF (βF , βH) = 2
µ
ρ
(
σ−1
σ
)
. It follows:
GW (βH , βF ) ≡ GH(βH , βF ) +GF (βF , βH) = 2
µ
ρ
(
σ − 1
σ
)
+ α (2 + SH(βH) + SF (βF )) (19)
The objective under cooperation is thus the first best, defined by βH = βF = 0. Indeed,
NTMs shift profits between countries but income is constant at the world level, no matter the
level of NTMs (see (12)). Besides, they only generate additional costs without any positive
welfare effect. In this fully symmetric setup, a trade agreement based on reciprocity can thus
restore efficiency; the two countries can make “equivalent concessions” by each withdrawing their
NTMs. This would induce equivalent exchanges of market access and profits while increasing
consumer surplus in both countries.
Cooperative equilibrium and set of organized firms.
This result however depends critically on the set of firms included in the objective function of
governments. Suppose now that in each country, only the most efficient exporters are organized
and influence the government decision. Therefore the Home government, instead of taking into
account the profits of the entire domestic industry ΠH (βH , βF ), only cares about the profits of
these firms: Π̃H (βH , βF ) = Π̃HH (βH) + Π̃HF (βF ). The aggregate protectionist effect derived
before implied ∂ΠHF (βF )∂βF < 0 (see (13)). However, if only the most efficient exporters are
considered, we now have ∂Π̃HF (βF )∂βF > 0; the most efficient Home exporters gain from an NTM
implementation in the Foreign country. Put differently, their interest with respect to βF is
opposite to the one of the Home industry as a whole and is now aligned with organized firms
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in the Foreign country: lobbies have now aligned interests internationally. The joint objective
function of governments can then be written as:
GW (βH , βF ) = Π̃H (βH , βF ) + Π̃F (βF , βH) + α (2 + SH(βH) + SF (βF )) (20)
The joint objective of governments under cooperation does not coincide with the first best
anymore as aggregate profits of organized firms worldwide increase with positive NTMs. This
has an important implication for the outcome of the cooperative equilibrium. To make this
point clear, suppose that in the non-cooperative equilibrium, some NTMs β∗H > 0 and β
∗
F > 0
are implemented. Governments then jointly negotiate βH and βF . In this case, the level of
NTMs increases in both countries, because each government now internalizes that its NTMs
also generate a positive externality for the best exporters (the organized firms) of the other
country. We get:
∂GW (βH , βF )
∂βH
∣∣∣∣
βH=β
∗
H
=
∂Π̃HH (βH)
∂βH
∣∣∣∣∣
βH=β
∗
H
+ α
∂SH(βH)
∂βH
∣∣∣∣
βH=β
∗
H︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∂Π̃FH (βH)
∂βH
∣∣∣∣∣
βH=β
∗
H
> 0
∂GW (βH , βF )
∂βF
∣∣∣∣
βF=β
∗
F
=
∂Π̃FF (βF )
∂βF
∣∣∣∣∣
βF=β
∗
F
+ α
∂SF (βF )
∂βF
∣∣∣∣
βF=β
∗
F︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∂Π̃HF (βF )
∂βF
∣∣∣∣∣
βF=β
∗
F
> 0
It follows:
Proposition 2. If only the most efficient firms are organized, a trade agreement makes both
countries worse off (from a pure welfare perspective) compared to the non-cooperative equilib-
rium.
This result directly relates to Rodrik (2018) and Maggi and Ossa (2019). Rodrik (2018) raises
concerns about trade agreements on regulatory rules, as governments may be influenced by large
exporters to shape trade agreements to capture rents in their export markets. Such agreements
could be detrimental to welfare. This is precisely what is happening here. Both governments
jointly agree to make NTMs more stringent to raise profits of their best exporters, at the
expense of social welfare. Maggi and Ossa (2019) explore how trade agreements on domestic
regulations affect welfare when governments are influenced by producer lobbies. They show that
trade agreements are welfare improving if they imply internationally opposite interests among
lobbies, but they can be welfare decreasing when lobbies have aligned interests internationally.
In their perfectly competititve setting, they show that producer lobbies have opposite interests
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internationally over process standards, but aligned interests over product standards. Here,
what determines whether lobbies’ interests are aligned or not internationally is not the policy
in question, but the identity of the firms that are organized. The profit shifting we put forward
in this paper implies that the most efficient firms have aligned interests worldwide. If they are
the only ones organized, trade agreements may bring the economy further away from the first
best.
4 Model - Asymmetric countries
We now turn to the asymmetric case of our model, which provides new insights about the
conditions for a trade agreement to be Pareto improving.
As shown above, a deep trade agreement between two symmetric countries, based on reci-
procity, could restore efficiency under the condition that governments do care about their entire
domestic industry (something we assume again from now on). This result does not hold any-
more when the firm distribution is asymmetric between countries. Suppose that one country
hosts relatively more of the most efficient firms in the world. It will benefit from the profit
shifting, even without the effect on the relative cost structure studied above in the symmetric
case. This country may thus have an incentive to implement an NTM. Moreover, this country
may benefit from the profit shifting effect in both markets. Therefore, there is no way to re-
taliate with another non-discriminatory NTM for the low productivity country, as this would
unambiguously worsen its situation.23
What could a trade agreement do in this situation? We show in this section that a Pareto
improving trade agreement is possible but would require an international profit shifting and
thus an international income redistribution, from the high to the low productivity country.
This contradicts the principle of reciprocity in trade negotiations, at least the way it is usually
understood.
4.1 Assumptions
We develop here a specific case of the open economy described above, in order to assess the role
of an asymmetry in the marginal cost distribution. We make here two additional assumptions
to do so in the easiest way. First, we restrict our analysis to the knife-edge case where γ = 1.
23The protectionist effect of non-discriminatory NTMs in this paper is based on the reallocation of market
shares of exiters towards the most efficient firms. Note that in the case of an asymmetry in the firm efficiency
distribution as here, an additional mechanism exists, away from the CES case. With variable markups, changes
in variable costs for all firms also reallocate market shares among incumbents, in turn generating another possible
source of protection in the aggregate.
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We therefore abstract from the possibility that the NTM generates an aggregate profit shifting
by altering the relative cost between domestic firms and foreign exporters. Second, we assume
zero variable trade costs, i.e. τ = 1. It follows that i) two firms with the same marginal cost
will serve the same market(s), irrespective of their country of origin, and ii) their prices will
be the same in each market. These two additional assumptions are useful to study the role of
an asymmetric distribution because the market equilibrium does not depend anymore on firms’
country of origin. The model is otherwise as before.
The role of these two assumptions appears clearly when looking at the definition of the
two cutoffs. From (8) and (9) we get aHH = aFH (and symmetrically aFF = aHF ). There is
thus one cutoff in the Home and one in the Foreign market. In the following, we thus refer
to the cutoff in market j as aj , with a
ρ
j =
µ
2σλF
1
(1+βj)
, while price indices are now given by
Pj =
(
2
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
λa1−σ+ρj
) 1
1−σ
with j = H,F . The aggregate profits are as before: Πj =∫
πH(a)dG(a) +
∫
πF (a)dG(a) =
µ
ρ
(
σ−1
σ
)
, j = H,F . In the absence of any asymmetry, the
aggregate profits are independent of βH and βF because there is, in each market, no aggregate
profit shifting between the two groups (because γ = 1). In this case, governments have thus no
incentive to introduce an NTM, as it would only reduce consumer surplus without generating
any additional income. However, at the firm level, an NTM still generates winners and losers
that are sorted according to their productivity. We get:
∂πj (ai)
∂βj
=
F
λ
( µ
2σλF
) 1−σ
ρ
a1−σi (1 + βj)
1−σ
ρ − F for j = H,F (21)
It follows:
Lemma 3. The variation of firm i’s profits in market j depends only on the stringency of the
NTM implemented there (βj), and not on firm location.
This result holds because γ = 1 (i.e. cost variation is the same for domestic and foreign
firms), implying that winners and losers from a given NTM are the same in both markets.
4.2 Asymmetry
Suppose now that we break the symmetry by introducing a disruption in the relative firm
marginal cost distribution. We assume that a set S of firms in Foreign “become” Home firms.
Note that this has no impact on the market equilibrium. The introduction of this disruption
only alters the aggregate profits of H and F firms.24 They are now given by: ΠH =
µ
ρ
(
σ−1
σ
)
+ΠS
24We could assume additionally that some H firms “become” F firms, in order to keep national incomes
constant. This has no importance in this setup with quasi-linear preferences.
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and ΠF =
µ
ρ
(
σ−1
σ
)
−ΠS , where ΠS is the aggregate profit of firms in S that “switch” from F to
H. As long as the marginal costs distribution of “switchers” does not replicate the original dis-
tribution (and thus generates an asymmetry), their aggregate profits will depend on the NTMs
implemented in Home and Foreign: ΠS (βH , βF ) =
∫
k∈S π
k
H(a, βH)dG(a)+
∫
k∈S π
k
F (a, βF )dG(a).
Lemma 3 implies that the set of switchers will benefit or lose from a given NTM implementation
in H and in F : ∂ΠS(βH ,βF )∂βH =
∂ΠS(βH ,βF )
∂βF
for βH = βF . It follows:
Proposition 3. If ∂ΠS∂βj 6= 0 for some βj, the implementation of the same non-discriminatory
NTM shifts profits in both countries towards the same firms: it has an aggregate protectionist
effect in one country and an “anti-protectionist” in the other.
Corollary. The two countries will not implement the same level of NTMs.
When there is a productivity distribution asymmetry, countries will not choose the same
level of NTMs (except the case with no NTMs in both countries). This directly raises the
question of the benefits of implementing international standards, as promoted by the TBT and
SPS agreements. Suppose that NTMs have a positive effect on welfare (not modelled here), but
at the same time increase production costs as suggested in the literature. The implementation of
a positive international standard will have, on top of its positive welfare effect, a redistributive
effect between countries as it will induce a profit shifting effect towards firms of the same
origin in the aggregate everywhere it is put in place. This may be one explanation for the
complaints of developing countries about recent trade negotiations over norms and standards
in the Doha round. This result also echoes the one in Grossman et al. (2020) and Parenti and
Vannoorenberghe (2019), showing that international standards may be desirable only among
similar countries. In these papers, similarity is with respect to the demand side, while we focus
here on the supply side.
4.3 Non-cooperative equilibrium
The outcome of the non-cooperative equilibrium depends on the shape of ∂ΠS∂βj and thus on
the productivity of switchers. For example, if switchers were among the most and the least
productive, the sign of ∂ΠS∂βj may well not be constant. To foster intuition, we focus on a
simple case, where one country (Home by assumption) is made unambiguously more productive.
Formally, we assume that a share η of firms having a marginal cost a ∈ [0, a] in the foreign
country “switch” their country of origin, from F to H. Therefore, the most efficient firms are
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overrepresented in H. In that case, ΠS (βH , βF ) is given by:
ΠS (βH , βF ) = η
∫ a
0
πH(a)dG(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠHS (βH)
+ η
∫ a
0
πF (a)dG(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠFS (βF )
(22)
We have:
∂ΠjS (βj)
∂βj
=

ηFaρ
((
aj(βj)
a
)σ−1
− 1
)
if a < aj (βj)
0 if a ≥ aj (βj)
(23)
Therefore, an NTM unambiguously shifts profits towards H firms in the aggregate, as
∂ΠjS(βj)
∂βj
≥
0, ∀βj . The decision of the two governments is taken as before: ∂Πjj(βj)∂βj + α
∂Sj(βj)
∂βj
= 0, for
j = H,F . Note that ∂ΠS(βH ,βF )∂βH =
∂ΠHS (βH)
∂βH
=
∂ΠHH(βj)
∂βH
≥ 0, while ∂ΠS(βH ,βF )∂βF =
∂ΠFS (βF )
∂βF
=
−∂ΠFF (βF )∂βF ≤ 0. It is straightforward that the foreign government will not introduce an NTM,
as it would shift profits towards Home firms, reducing consumer surplus. The Home government
will introduce an NTM if the profit shifting is large enough to more than compensate for the
consumer surplus loss. Labeling ã =
( µ
2σλF
) 1
ρ , the marginal cost of the least efficient firm if no
NTM is implemented, the Home government implements an NTM if and only if:
(
a
ã
)ρ(( ã
a
)σ−1
− 1
)
>
2α
η
σ
σ − 1
(24)
See appendix B for a proof.25
The left-hand side of (24) is necessarily positive as ãa ≥ 1. It follows that if the Home
government is politically motivated enough, i.e. if α is small enough, it will introduce an NTM.
Only the high productivity country may have a unilateral incentive to implement an NTM. In
this situation the low productivity country will never implement any NTM because it would
shift local rents towards foreign firms. In other words, the low productivity country is harmed
by the beggar-thy-neighbor policy of the high productivity country and cannot retaliate. Can
a deep trade agreement make everyone better off? This is the focus of the next section.
4.4 Cooperative equilibrium and reciprocity
The principle of reciprocity is defined in a broad and relatively vague way in the WTO texts,
simply stating that countries should exchange “equivalent concessions”. It has been formalized
by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as an equivalent exchange of market access between countries,
25This equation is non linear in a. This because a small a means that only few firms switch, thus the profit
shifting cannot be large. Increasing a implies more profit shifting, but also more less efficient switchers that after
some point will be hurt by the NTM.
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which thus ensures no terms of trade manipulation (see Bagwell and Staiger (2001) about
domestic policies). In a model featuring a delocation motive for trade policy, Ossa (2011)
formalizes the principle of reciprocity as an increase in imports, keeping the trade balance
unchanged. As such, it also eliminates the possibility of delocation in his setup. Mrazova
(2011) shows that in an oligopolistic setup, reciprocity should be defined as keeping the profit
balance constant. However, none of these definitions allow to reach an agreement that would be
Pareto improving in our analysis. Below, we provide the conditions that an agreement should
respect in our setup to ensure a Pareto improvement. It requires “non equivalent concessions”,
i.e. non equivalent exchanges in market access and profits.
Cooperative solution: Pareto improvement.
The first best is characterized by the maximization of the joint welfare of governments, as
defined in (19). The condition for a cooperative equilibrium to emerge is to be Pareto improving.
We define as βCEH and β
CE
F the NTMs that would be chosen in the cooperative equilibrium,
while β∗H and β
∗
F are those chosen under the non-cooperative equilibrium. We consider the
situation where there is an inefficiency to solve, namely that the high productivity country has
chosen to implement unilaterally some NTMs as in the example just above: β∗H > 0 and β
∗
F = 0.
We define variation between the cooperative equilibrium situation and the non-cooperative one
with ∆. A cooperative agreement thus requires to respect the following:
∆GH(βH , βF ) ≡ GH(βCEH , βCEF )−GH(β∗H , β∗F ) ≥ 0 (25)
∆GF (βF , βH) ≡ GF (βCEF , βCEH )−GF (β∗F , β∗H) ≥ 0 (26)
The variation in the objective functions of the two governments is the (weighted) sum of
the variation of consumer surplus and the variation in aggregate profits (and thus income). We
may rewrite these conditions as:
∆GH(βH , βF ) ≥ 0⇔ ∆ΠS (βH , βF ) + α∆SH(βH) ≥ 0
∆GF (βF , βH) ≥ 0⇔ α∆SF (βF )−∆ΠS (βH , βF ) ≥ 0
To be Pareto improving, a deep trade agreement has to respect the following necessary
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conditions:
∆SF (βF ) + ∆SH(βH) ≥ 0
∆SH(βH) ≥ 0
∆SF (βF ) ≤ 0
∆ΠS (βH , βF ) ≤ 0
Proposition 4. When protectionist NTMs are implemented due to an asymmetry in the pro-
ductivity distribution, a Pareto improving agreement requires an international income redistri-
bution.
Proof. see appendix C.
A Pareto improvement implies an aggregate profit shifting from country H to country F
(∆ΠS (βH , βF ) ≤ 0) and thus an international income redistribution. This is intuitive: to
improve world welfare, the Home government should decrease its NTMs (which is the only
inefficiency), leading to more market access and more profits for Foreign firms. This implies
a cost for Home that therefore needs to be compensated by an increase in the NTMs in the
Foreign country, in turn implying more market access and more profits for Home firms there.
As a result, both countries increase their imports. However, this increase in NTMs reduces
social welfare in the Foreign country, while the reduction of the NTMs improves social welfare
at Home. Put differently, equivalent exchange of market access and profits have asymmetric
welfare effects. Therefore, to get a Pareto improving agreement, countries should make a non
equivalent exchange in market access, leading to an international profit shifting and thus an
international income redistribution from Home to Foreign. This is not compatible with any
standard definition of reciprocity.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that non-discriminatory NTMs can be used as protectionist tools, by
shifting profits towards domestic firms in the local market. This means that non-discriminatory
requirements do not avoid the possibility of beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Moreover, this type
of policy becomes more efficient as the economy becomes more open to international trade,
providing a possible reason for the rise in NTMs observed over the years after the creation of
the WTO. It also shows trade agreements may be welfare detrimental if governments are only
influenced by the most efficient firms, as informally argued by Rodrik (2018). When countries
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differ in their firm productivity distribution, the implementation of international standards
induces some international income distribution. In this context, a deep trade agreement (on
domestic regulation) should not be based on reciprocity to ensure a Pareto improvement. These
results may explain why recent negotiations have proven difficult.
This paper suggests that beyond non-discrimination obligations with respect to firms’ origin,
NTMs may need to be discriminatory with respect to firms size/efficiency. NTMs that would
be proportionally more costly for more efficient firms (for instance through a cross-subsidization
policy) would not reallocate market shares and profits, avoiding the possibility of protectionist
policies.
Overall, our results question the efficiency of the two key principles of the WTO when
negotiations deal with domestic policies. WTO redactors were aware of these possible problems.
The answer has been the inclusion of the non-violation clause, allowing complaints even if no
agreement has been violated. However, analyzing various non-violation claims, Staiger and
Sykes (2011) conclude that “the pertinent non-violation decisions to date all seem to suggest
that the measure in question must somehow favor domestic over imported goods. A regulatory
measure that disadvantages them equally (in non-discriminatory fashion) seems outside the
scope of the doctrine”. This paper thus suggests that a new doctrine is needed for international
trade rules over domestic policies.
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A Non-cooperative equilibrium - symmetric countries
Decision of the Home government is given by:
∂ΠHH(βH)
∂βH
+ α
∂SH(βH)
∂βH
= 0
Consumer surplus may be written as SH(βH) = µ lnµ− µ+ µσ−1 lnP
1−σ
H . We obtain:
∂SH
∂βH
= − µ
σλ
σ
σ − 1
1 +
(
1+βH
γ+βH
τ1−σ
) ρ
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(1 + βH)
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It follows directly that βH is given by:
σ − 1
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1 + βH
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τ1−σ
) 1−σ+ρ
σ−1
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γ + βH
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τσ−1
) ρ
σ−1
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This defines a unique equilibrium as the RHS is monotonically increasing in βH (see below).
Trade liberalization.
Call F (βH) the RHS of the above expression:
F (βH) =
1 + βH
1− γ
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We get:
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> 0
∂F (βH)
∂βH
> 0 implies that (18) defines a unique equilibrium. Moreover, as ∂F (βH)∂τ > 0, trade
liberalization (a decrease in τ) increases the equilibrium NTM β∗H .
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Proof:
∂F (βH)
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A sufficient condition for ∂F∂β > 0 is:
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B Non-cooperative equilibrium - asymmetric countries
Recall that ΠS is given by:
ΠS (βH , βF ) = η
∫ a
0
πH(a)dG(a)da︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠHS (βH)
+ η
∫ a
0
πF (a)dG(a)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠFS (βF )
This implies that aggregate profits at the country level are no more constant with respect to
a possible NTM implemented in each country, because aggregate profits of “switchers” depend
on βH and βF . We obtain:
ΠHS (βH) = ηF (1 + βH) a
ρ
(
λ
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aH (βH)
a
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− 1
)
It follows:
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Condition for a positive NTM.
An NTM is introduced by the Home government if, around βH = 0, the income gain more
than compensates the consumer surplus loss. Labeling ã =
( µ
2σλF
) 1
ρ , we get:
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Moreover,
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It follows:
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C Cooperative equilibrium - asymmetric countries
To get a Pareto improvement, we need the following two conditions to be fulfilled:
(1) ∆GH(βH , βF ) ≥ 0⇔ ∆ΠS (βH , βF ) + α∆SH(βH) ≥ 0
(2) ∆GF (βF , βH) ≥ 0⇔ α∆SF (βF )−∆ΠS (βH , βF ) ≥ 0
We show here the necessary conditions for these conditions to be respected. First, note that
conditions (1) and (2) imply ∆GH(βH , βF ) + ∆GF (βF , βH) ≥ 0. As the profit shifting is a
zero sum game, we thus need ∆SF (βF ) + ∆SH(βH) ≥ 0. Second, remind that ∆SF (βF ) =
SF
(
βCEF
)
− SF (β∗F ). For condition (2) to be respected, we need:
α∆SF (βF ) > ∆ΠS (βH , βF )
As ∂SF (βF )∂βF < 0 and β
∗
F = 0, we necessarily have ∆SF (βF ) ≤ 0, it follows that:
∆ΠS (βH , βF ) < 0
For condition (1) to be respected, we need:
α∆SH(βH) > −∆ΠS (βH , βF )
As ∆ΠS (βH , βF ) < 0, it follows:
∆SH(βH) > 0
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